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With the rapid proliferation of mobile devices, explosive mobile applications (apps) are developed in the past few years. However,
the functions of mobile apps are varied and the designs of them are not well understood by end users, especially the activities and
functions related to user privacy. Therefore, understanding how much danger of mobile apps with respect to privacy violation to
mobile users is becomes a critical issue when people use mobile devices. In this paper, we evaluate the mobile app privacy violation
of mobile users by computing the danger coefficient. In order to help people reduce the privacy leakage, we combine both the user
preference tomobile apps and the privacy risk of apps and propose amobile app usage recommendationmethod namedAppURank
to recommend the secure apps with the same function as the “dangerous” one for people use. The evaluation results show that our
recommendation can reduce the privacy leakage by 50%.
1. Introduction
The rapid growth of mobile devices has been leading to the
prosperity of mobile applications (apps). For example, as of
the end of 2014, the number of apps on Play Store has been
over 1.4 million and over 1.2 million on Apple Store. This
number is still growing dramatically with the proliferation
of mobile devices. Mobile users download these mobile apps
and use them on their mobile devices to satisfy different
purposes. However, the functions of mobile apps are varied
and the designs of them are not well understood by end users,
especially the activities and functions related to user privacy.
Indeed, to improve user experience and the functionality
of mobile apps, developers start to move their eyes on the
personalized service that can be provided by apps. They
develop new functional apps or enhance the capability of apps
by digging into the personal information, such as location
information, contacts, camera, messaging, and even calling
service. However, when users launch apps on their mobile
devices, theymay fall into danger as some unknown activities
or functions might cause privacy issue.
Although app stores (e.g., Google Play)may remove those
apps withmalfunctions or low quality periodically, manywell
developed apps with privacy violations are not perceived by
the stores. In other words, app stores release the right to end
users to let them decide whether to install the apps or not.
In such case, most end users download and install those apps
by neglecting the privacy warning. Even when some users do
notice the privacy issue, as the functionality and preference
of mobile apps, they still install them into the mobile device.
Once the apps are installed, users’ privacy informationwill be
leaked when they launch those apps.
As mobile apps serve for different functionalities, dif-
ferent types of privacy information may be leaked by users
for launching different types of mobile apps. For instance, a
location-based service (LBS) needs to collect user real time
location information from users. It may refer to home and
workplace where users may not expect to be exposed. A
social-aware service needs to extract contacts from users,
which violates many users’ personal life as well, not to
mention the information collected for function-unrelated
purpose. In fact, it is reported that users have growing
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concern about their privacy while using mobile apps. A
recent survey from IDG news reveals that over 30% of
mobile users prefer to uninstall those apps after learning the
personal information they collected. Unfortunately, users do
not know how much of the personal information has been
collected and how much danger of mobile apps with respect
to privacy violation to mobile users. Therefore, it is crucial
to understand how dangerous are installed apps on mobile
devices aswell as howmuch privacy risk is taken by launching
those apps. It will also be beneficial for mobile users to know
how to reduce the privacy leakage by using those apps with
less privacy concern and meanwhile maintain the quality of
experience.
Thus far, majority of mobile app recommendation
approaches have been developed based on the popularity
of apps while neglecting the privacy issues existing in
mobile apps [1–3]. Several privacy-concerned app detection
and recommendation mechanisms are proposed to discover
the malfunction of mobile apps. They either focus on the
service provider side to let app stores recommend those
apps with less privacy concern without considering the
user personalization [4] or target the developer side to
investigate the inside of apps, find malware code, and restrict
the app access permission [5–9]. However, these actions
need the cooperation with either service providers or apps
developers, which makes them difficult to be implemented in
practice.
In this paper, in order to measure how much privacy
a mobile user attempts on the mobile phone and help to
recommend apps with less privacy, we propose a privacy
evaluation mechanism by analyzing the app usage data. The
violation of privacy depends not only on the risks of apps,
but also on the user usage pattern. Although some apps
violate user privacy heavily, user information cannot leak if
the app has not been used. To evaluate the privacy leakage,
we define a danger coefficient to quantify the privacy and
analyze the privacy violation distribution of mobile users.
To reduce the privacy leakage from mobile devices, on one
hand, we need to understand how much privacy a mobile
app can expose. On the other hand, we need to investigate
the apps usage of different users. Therefore, we combine
both the user preference to mobile apps and the privacy risk
of mobile apps for apps recommendation. To formulate the
user preference to mobile apps, we apply the distribution of
common preference probabilistic method, which can enrich
the context of personalized preference. To understand the
privacy violation of mobile apps, we measure the privacy
access permissions of mobile apps. Finally, we seek a balance
between the user preference to apps and the privacy violation
of apps to propose an app usage recommendation method
named AppURank. According to the functionality of mobile
apps, we classify them into groups by the topic model. The
proposed approach recommends the same functional apps
with lighter privacy concern and high user preference. We
evaluate our mobile app recommendation approach with
extensive experiments. The results show that our proposed
recommendation method can halve the danger of mobile
devices and meanwhile maintain the same level of user
preference.
The contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
(i) We carry out a mechanism to evaluate the extent of
privacy leakage when people use theirmobile devices.
We define a danger coefficient to measure the privacy
violation of apps from usage perspective and analyze
the privacy violation distribution of mobile users.
(ii) We propose an app usage recommendation approach
for end users, named AppURank, by combining user
preference, privacy risks, and functionality of apps.
The proposed method is to recommend people with
preferred apps but with less privacy violation.
(iii) We evaluate the app recommendationmethod on our
collected data. It shows that the method can reduce
the danger of mobile devices to half and meanwhile
maintain the same level of usage preference.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the problem,
introduces the definition of danger coefficient of mobile
users, and provides a recommendation on the app usage that
can minimize the risk of privacy leakage. Section 4 shows
the experimental results. Conclusions are finally given in
Section 5.
2. Related Literature
In this section, we review the state of the art for the
privacy leakage evaluation of mobile apps and mobile app
recommendation approaches.
The privacy issue of mobile apps has been studied for
many years. One group of previous studies regarding privacy
issue of mobile apps concerns the risk analysis of mobile
apps. For instance, Au et al. [6] surveyed the permission
systems of smartphone operating systems from the amount
of controls, the information released to users, and the levels
of interactivity from users. Felt et al. [5] focused on the
permission request of various mobile apps to determine
whether Android developers follow least privilege with their
permission requests. They further built Stowaway to detect
overprivilege in Android apps. Enck et al. [7] proposed
TaintDroid, which provided real time analysis of mobile
apps on the monitoring of their data access by leveraging
Android’s virtualized execution environment. In contrast,
majority of mobile app privacy studies are proposed for
privacy violation or mobile app malfunction detection. To
deal with the information stealing of mobile apps, Zhou et
al. [8] carried out the TISSA system, which can empower
users to flexibly control the accessibility of mobile apps to
personal information. Enck et al. [9] exploited a rule-based
certification model named Kirin to perform lightweight
certification of mobile apps at installing time to reduce the
privacy issue caused by mobile apps.
However, these mechanisms need investigation on the
code installed in mobile apps in order to identify the privacy
violation, which is difficult for all apps installed on mobile
devices. Meanwhile, people do not like apps scanning their
mobile devices all the time. In this paper, we propose the
Mobile Information Systems 3
privacy preserving method by recommendation approach,
which can avoid the installation of risky apps.
The majority of mobile app recommendation methods
consider the popularity or user preference as factors for the
decisionmaking. For instance, AppJoy [1] made personalized
mobile app recommendation by analyzing how users actually
use their installed apps. They applied collaborative filtering
algorithm for individual recommendation. Yu et al. [2] and
Zhu et al. [3] considered the user context for mobile app
recommendation andused LatentDirichletAllocation (LDA)
topic model to describe the problem of mobile apps recom-
mendation. Few papers focus on the mobile apps based on
privacy issue. Peng et al. [10] proposed a risk rankingmethod
of Android apps using probabilistic generative model to tell
users the privacy risk of mobile apps before installation. The
other one by Zhu et al. [4] used the modern portfolio theory
to recommend mobile apps from the perspective of app
store by considering the awareness of security and privacy.
Our paper tries to recommend mobile apps from personal-
ized user-app usage perspective to avoid privacy violation.
There are some literatures focusing on permission settings
recommendation to preserve user privacy. Lin et al. [11]
proposed to provide reasonable default settings to help users
configure their privacy settings by identifying distinct privacy
profiles. Liu et al. [12] proposed and implemented PriWe,
which leveraged the crowd sourced permission settings to
understand users’ privacy expectation and provides app
specific recommendations to mitigate information leakage.
We use the similar methods as [10] to obtain the privacy
risk of mobile apps. However, different from the state of the
art [4, 10], we not only consider the privacy risk of mobile
apps in general, but also combine the function relativity of
mobile apps to the permissions and people usage patterns of
mobile apps to evaluate the privacy danger of mobile apps
to users. We then propose a mobile app recommendation
method by considering both user preferences andmobile app
privacy.
3. Problem Formation
3.1. Preliminaries. When an app is installed or launched on
mobile device, it always asks the permission to access certain
information.The permissionmeans the capability users grant
to mobile apps so that mobile apps can access certain part of
mobile users’ information. These permissions are associated
with mobile apps to either help the mobile apps to achieve
some functions (e.g., localization) or fulfill themobile apps to
collect user data. The permissions requested by a mobile app
are independent of each other. When mobile app is installed
or launched on the smartphone, the users have the right
to make decision for the app to access the permission of
information. In fact, the information those apps intend to
access may refer to the sensitive personal private data, such
as location information and the control of hardware (e.g.,
camera). For instance, Table 1 illustrates the access permission
list requested by a version of Google search app in an app
store. It can be seen that some information requested by the
app permissions, such as network connection and storage,
is necessary for the function of the app (i.e., information
Table 1: Access permission of a search engine app.
Permission Description
Network connection Allow the app to access the Internet
Storage Allow accessing external SD card
Phone state Allow accessing phone information
Personal information
Allow accessing contact
information, messages, emails, and
so forth
Location Allow accessing the geographicalinformation instantly
Hardware Allow accessing camera, audio, andrecorder
Payment service Allow running the operation forpayment
System tool Allow setting up the display
searching), referred here to as “function-related” for the
app. At the same time some other information requested
by the app permissions, such as phone state, personal data,
payment service, and system tools, is not highly correlated
with the function of the app, referred here to as “function-
unrelated” for the app. As a matter of fact, for different
types of permissions, the degree to which they violate the
privacy is different. For instance, as shown in Table 1,
the payment service permission that allows running the
operation for payment is more severe than the permission
of network connection. There are two reasons for such
a judgement. First, the payment service permission may
cause the economic loss, which is more vital than the net-
work connection. Second, the payment service is function-
unrelated while network connection is function-related for
searching function.Therefore, all the information involved in
an app can be categorized into several tiers according to its
degree of privacy violation and its relativity to app function:
(a) “normal permission,” which does not involve sensitive
information ofmobile users, such as network connection and
storage; (b) “severe permission,” meaning the information is
severely related to user privacy, such as personal information,
location, and payment service; and (c) “system permissions,”
related to the control of hardware and system, such as the
access of hardware and setup of system level configuration.
Therefore, combining the function and the extent of privacy
violation, six different types of information permission are
considered: (1) function-related with normal permission, (2)
function-related with severe permission, (3) function-related
with system permission, (4) function-unrelated with normal
permission, (5) function-unrelated with severe permission,
and (6) function-unrelated with system permission.
Although apps violate user privacy by permissions of
accessing user information, mobile users still install and
launch different types of mobile apps on their smartphones
according to their preferences. In order to recommend
apps by considering both user privacy preserving and user
preference, in this paper, we discuss three issues: (1) how to
measure the privacy risk of an app and the privacy violation to
mobile users by launchingmobile apps, (2) how to determine
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user preference to mobile apps, and (3) how to balance the
privacy violation to mobile users and the user-app preference
to meet the requirement of users.
In the following, we will define the danger coefficient
to quantify the privacy violations of permissions to mobile
users and also address the above-mentioned three issues to
recommend mobile apps from usage perspective.
3.2. Danger Coefficient. Generally speaking, the privacy
information is normally leaked when people launch an app
with privacy permission.We introduce here a new parameter,
called danger coefficient (DC), capable of expressing the
leakage of privacy when users run apps on their mobile
device.
To evaluate the DC of each user, two factors need to be
determined. The first one is the privacy risk of each app,
which is reflected by the permissions that the app asks from
users. We measure the privacy risk of permissions requested
by the app and consider it as one factor for evaluating the
app’s DC. The second one is the app usage pattern by the
user. In what pattern the mobile app is used indicates the
probability that the privacy information disclosed by the app
will be leaked, which is considered as the other factor for
evaluating app’s DC.
We now address the problem by characterizing and
quantify the privacy risk of permissions and then the privacy
risk of an app. Permissions can be classified into three classes,
which are normal permissions, critical permissions, and
system permissions as we discussed in the previous section.
Requesting a more critical permission increases risk more
than requesting a less critical one. For the quantification,
we leverage the probabilistic approach proposed in [10] to
evaluate the risk of each of the categories of permissions.
For the generic app 𝑎
𝑖
(𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑀), the permis-
sions that will be accessed are denoted by the set 𝑃
𝑖
=
{𝑝
𝑖,1
, 𝑝
𝑖,2
, . . . , 𝑝
𝑖,𝑁
}, where 𝑁 is the total number of permis-
sions. The generic variable 𝑝
𝑖,𝑗
is binary and assumes value 0
or 1 if permission 𝑗 is not or is present in app 𝑎
𝑖
. For mobile
apps, different types of permissions may correlate with each
other. For instance, permissions related to network (including
Internet access, checkingWiFi state, checking network status,
changingWiFi status, and changing network connection) are
mutually correlated. However, such dependence introduces
sophisticated analysis to conduct privacy risk evaluation. In
contrast, the study [10] discovers that assuming the indepen-
dence of different permissions can still perform well for the
overall privacy risk evaluation but it is more simplistic for the
analysis compared with dependence situations. Furthermore,
the assumption of independence of different permissions
allows a monotonic model, which allows the consideration
of each individual permission. Besides, it can also help to
differentiate different classes of permissions.
Therefore, if we use 𝑓(𝑃
𝑖
) to indicate the privacy risk
factor for app 𝑖, 𝑃
𝑖
is generated by 𝑁 independent Bernoulli
random variables and is given by
𝑓 (𝑃
𝑖
) =
𝑁
∏
𝑗=1
𝑟
𝑗
𝑝𝑖,𝑗 (1 − 𝑟
𝑗
)
1−𝑝𝑖,𝑗
, (1)
where 𝑟
𝑗
is the probability that permission 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁) is
accessed by an app.
Following [10], 𝑟
𝑗
is obtained using a Beta(𝑟
𝑖
| 𝑎
0
, 𝑏
0
)
function. That is,
𝑟
𝑗
=
∑
𝑀
𝑖=1
𝑝
𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝑎
0
𝑀+ 𝑎
0
+ 𝑏
0
, (2)
where𝑀 is the total number of apps used for evaluation. In
this paper, the value of𝑀 is set to 900 as the dataset contains
900 mobile apps. To suggest the several privacy violation
risks, we set 𝑎
0
= 1, 𝑏
0
= 2𝑀 with less penalty effect for
critical permissions. For normal permissions, we set 𝑎
0
= 1,
𝑏
0
= 𝑀1, which is normal distribution suggesting the less
effect of the privacy risk, 𝑎
0
= 1, 𝑏
0
= 𝑀 with less penalty
effect for critical permissions, for normal permissions the
value 𝑎
0
= 1, 𝑏
0
= 1, which is normal distribution suggesting
the less effect of the privacy risk. With this method, different
types of permission privacy risks can be distinguished.
Furthermore, apps may request both function-related
and function-unrelated permissions. For example, an app
providing map service needs location information as its
function-related permission, whereas if an app serves as
chatting service, requesting calling permissionwill very likely
be considered as function-unrelated permission. If an app
requests a function-related permission, the privacy violation
is considered much weaker than that of function-unrelated
permission request. To show the difference, we assign differ-
ent weights for the privacy risk and define the weight factor
𝜔
𝑖,𝑗
of permission 𝑗 for app 𝑎
𝑖
. The weights of the function-
related permissions should be less than that of the function-
unrelated permissions, as the function-related permissions
are about to enable functions and services, whereas the
function-unrelated permissions intend to collect user privacy
information. For instance, we take an empirical value that
the weight for function-related permissions is 0.5 and for
function-unrelated permissions is 1. Then the overall risk
factor 𝑓(𝑎
𝑖
) of app 𝑎
𝑖
that takes into account the weight of
the different risks is given by
𝑓 (𝑎
𝑖
) = 𝑓 (𝑃
𝑖
) ∗
𝑁
∏
𝑗=1
(𝜔
𝑖,𝑗
) . (3)
Considering the app privacy risk is monotonically
decreasing with respect to the probability of using granted
permissions, which means removing a permission always
reduces the risk value of an app, for privacy risk calculation
of an app, we use the following function [10]:
𝑅 (𝑎
𝑖
) = − ln [𝑓 (𝑎
𝑖
)] . (4)
As far as the app usage pattern is concerned, a user with
longer time duration of using an appwill havemore chance to
access privacy information. Although there are some mobile
apps that are launched in the background and steal the user
privacy information without being invoked by users, they are
not measured and counted in our analysis. In this paper, we
assume that the probability that amobile app accesses privacy
information is proportional to the time duration in which
the app is used. Therefore, we measure the usage pattern by
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expressing the fraction of time user 𝑚 (𝑚 = 1, . . . , 𝐿) in
which uses app 𝑎
𝑖
; that is,𝑈
𝑖,𝑚
= 𝑡
𝑖,𝑚
/𝑇, where 𝑡
𝑖,𝑚
is the total
time usage of app 𝑎
𝑖
by user 𝑚 and 𝑇 is the total observation
interval of the system.
The state of the art suggests that interevent times of
human behaviors follow Poisson distribution [13]. In this
paper, we assume the interusage time follows a Poisson
distribution with the parameter equal to 𝜆
𝑖,𝑚
for user 𝑚
running app 𝑎
𝑖
. Then 𝑈
𝑖,𝑚
= 1 − 1/𝜆
𝑖,𝑚
.
The DC measures the danger degree of a user using a
mobile device. For a user 𝑢
𝑚
, the danger coefficient can be
derived by combining the app privacy risk and the app usage
pattern and is expressed as
DC (𝑢
𝑚
) =
𝑀
∑
𝑖=1
[𝑅 (𝑎
𝑖
) ∗ 𝑈
𝑖,𝑚
] , (5)
where𝑀 is the number of apps launched in the device. The
largerDC(𝑢
𝑚
) indicates themore chance for privacy violation
when user 𝑢
𝑚
launches apps in the mobile device. For a user
with multiple devices, each device can be evaluated by the
above procedure for the danger coefficient estimation. We
use DC as a metric to evaluate the danger degree of the
recommendation algorithms in Section 4.
3.3. User-App Preference. The user-app preference reflects
the preference relationship between individuals and apps. As
each individual user may not display enough information to
fully discover his or her individual preference, we employ an
individual user-app preference based on the distribution of
commonpreference, as presented in [3]. Specifically, we firstly
investigate the common preference of many users and then
represent each user’s preference by a distribution of common
preference. If the common preferences are presented by 𝑧, the
conditional probability that a user 𝑢
𝑚
prefers the category a
given the set of all apps 𝐴 can be represented as
𝑃 (𝑎 | 𝐴, 𝑢
𝑚
) =
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝐴 | 𝑢
𝑚
) ∗ 𝑃 (𝑢
𝑚
)
𝑃 (𝐴, 𝑢
𝑚
)
. (6)
For given apps 𝐴 and user 𝑢
𝑚
, 𝑃(𝑢
𝑚
) and 𝑃(𝐴, 𝑢
𝑚
) are
constant. Therefore, we have
𝑃 (𝑎 | 𝐴, 𝑢
𝑚
) ∼ 𝑃 (𝑎, 𝐴 | 𝑢
𝑚
) ∼ ∑
𝑧
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝐴, 𝑧 | 𝑢
𝑚
)
∼ ∑
𝑧
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝐴 | 𝑧) 𝑃 (𝑧 | 𝑢𝑚) ,
(7)
where the preference of user 𝑢
𝑚
to the category of apps 𝑎 is
determined by the common preferences of many users (i.e.,
𝑃(𝑎, 𝐴 | 𝑧)) and also the user’s personal preference conveyed
by a distribution of common preferences (i.e., 𝑃(𝑧 | 𝑢
𝑚
)).
The calculation of common preferences of other users and
the distribution of common preferences of user 𝑢
𝑚
can be
presented by the normalized number of apps launched by
user 𝑢
𝑚
and other users.
The above user-app preference suggests the preference of
a user to a category of mobile apps. To identify categories
of mobile apps, we first find the categories of each mobile
app with its assigned categories. However, such classification
is not fine-grained enough for app usage preference recom-
mendation. For example, many mobile apps are associated
with offline services, such as online banking apps or social
media apps. A Facebook social app cannot be replaced by
a Twitter social app. Therefore, for each category of mobile
apps, we use a topic model to categorize apps in different
coarse grained preference categories into different groups
according to their functions and usage context. For this
purpose, we employ LatentDirichlet Allocation (LDA)model
[14], in which an app is associated with a word in a document,
and each category is a topic. With such topic model, apps are
put into different fine-grained preference groups. Specifically,
for each user, we extract the context components (i.e., time
stamp, and location) from the usage record and consider
the set of context components of a user as this user’s bag
of context components. For the fine-grained preference of
each user, the procedure is conducted as follows. It begins
with a random assignment of fine-grained preference to each
context component. It then iteratively estimates the condi-
tional probability of assigning of the preference to context
component and updates the preference of each context com-
ponent according to the latest calculation. The assignment
will converge finally, which means each context component
is assigned with a fine-grained preference. Then the user
fine-grained preference will be determined by her context
component bag. But LDA has some drawbacks to identify the
sequence of words and also it is in the topics composition in
which the same words appear in the multiple topics. In our
case, these drawbacks do not affect the performance ofmobile
app group identification. For the fine-grained preference
classification, only the special words associated with the fine-
grained group are used. Moreover, the classification does
not involve the sequence of words. Therefore, LDA model
is capable of fine-grained classification for mobile apps. If a
person launches an app on the mobile device, it is indicated
that the person is interested in the functionality provided by
the app. If the app is considered with high risk, then another
app in the same category should be recommended.
3.4. App Usage Recommendation. As the high risky app
may cause more privacy leakage, recommending the user
preferred apps with less privacy risk is more desirable. In
this section, we will propose a method for app usage rec-
ommendation combining required function, user preference,
and privacy, named AppURank.
Regarding required functions, we recommend apps
which are in the same category as the launched apps to
guarantee the function similarity. Then we recommend apps
according to preference and privacy. The objective of the
app usage recommendation is finding a group of apps A
consisting of a collection of 𝑘 apps with the corresponding
weight 𝛼
𝑖
and∑𝑘
𝑖=1
𝛼
𝑖
= 1 which display minimal privacy risk
andmeanwhile satisfy the individual preference and function
requirement. The general formulation of the objective can be
presented as
max
A
𝑘
∑
𝑖=1
𝛼
𝑖
∗ [𝑃 (𝑎 | 𝐴, 𝑢
𝑚
)] − 𝑏 ∗
𝑘
∑
𝑖=1
𝛼
𝑖
∗ 𝑅 (𝑎
𝑖
) , (8)
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where 𝛼
𝑖
∈ 𝑎 suggests 𝛼
𝑖
is one mobile app in category 𝑎
and the value of 𝑏 depends on the privacy and individual
preference requirement of users. For example, if a user
considers privacy more important, then the value of 𝑏 will
be larger, while if a user takes user preference more into
account, then the value of 𝑏 will be smaller. Given the vector
𝛼 = [𝛼
1
, 𝛼
2
, . . . , 𝛼
𝑘
], the corresponding preference vector and
risk vector are represented by 𝑃 and 𝑅. Equation (8) can be
rewritten as
max
A
𝛼
⊤
𝑃 − 𝑏 ∗ 𝛼
⊤
𝑅. (9)
In this case, 𝑃 and 𝑅 are independent, and the selection
of 𝛼 is to rank mobile apps according to user preference and
privacy risk according to the calculation of 𝑅(𝑎
𝑖
) and 𝑃(𝑎 |
𝐴, 𝑢
𝑚
) and then combine the two aspects, as specified by (9).
The app with the highest combination value is considered as
the most recommended app. Apps with top 𝑘 values are the
top 𝑘 apps on the recommendation list.
4. Performance Results
In this section, we describe the experimental data and
evaluate the privacy risk of mobile apps, danger coefficient
of mobile users, and AppURank recommendation method.
4.1. Experimental Data. In this paper, we need two data
traces to evaluate the danger coefficient and the proposed
recommendation approach.
One data trace contains apps with their requested per-
missions, and the permissions are marked with function-
related and function-unrelated. There are 900 apps and their
permissions in the data trace. For each app, we collect the
permission information from the privacy description in the
store and use a matrix to store them. The rows are apps, and
columns are permissions. If an app requests a permission,
the element in the matrix will be 1; otherwise, it will be
0. Then we take the function relativity into consideration.
We investigate the function relativity in two stages. In the
first stage, we crawl the coarse grained categories of mobile
apps and identify the permission by their main functions.
For example, a location-based social service should need the
location information, which means location information is
function-related for the location-based social service. In the
second stage, we manually identify the other permissions
accessed by each of the mobile apps. For instance, an alarm
app could require access to microphone to let the user
record some memo/voice to be played during timeout. If
the permission is requested by malicious functions of an
app, it is considered as function-unrelated. For a function-
related permission, the value of element is changed to 0.5. For
function-unrelated permissions, the value of element is still
1. Then the privacy risk of each app in this data trace can be
calculated using the expression of 𝑅(𝑎
𝑖
) in (4). Figure 1 shows
the distribution of apps in terms of the number of requested
permissions. It shows that about 20% of apps request less
than 10 permissions. The percentage of apps requesting 10
to 20 permissions reaches over 75%, and about 5% of apps
request over 20 permissions. On average, each app requests 12
permissions. Figure 2 shows the distribution of apps in terms
5 10 15 20 25 300
The number of requested permissions
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
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F
Figure 1: CDF of permission distribution from apps perspective.
Table 2: Characteristics of the dataset.
Characteristics Value
Users 13,969
Duration 545 days
Network types 2G/3G/4GWi-Fi
Applications 16,878
Total traffic 13.8 TB
Number of records Over 103 million
of different types of permissions. More than 70% of apps
request Internet access, phone state, and network state.There
are several apps requests for external device format, which
highly violate the user privacy and even refer to the security
of mobile devices. Regarding function relativity of apps, we
drawFigure 3 to show the average number of function-related
and function-unrelated permissions of different categories of
apps. It shows that function-unrelated permissions are more
than function-related permissions in most cases. In the apps
of security, car/cab, social, voice, reader, helper, and tools, the
function-unrelated permissions are requested twice as much
as function-related permissions.
The other data trace is the mobile users and their mobile
app usage pattern. In order to obtain such data, we design
a mobile app named AntTest (http://www.wandoujia.com/
apps/edu.bupt.anttest) on Android platform. Indeed, the
AntTest application is developed to measure network speed
of mobile device. For such purpose, the data such as app
usage pattern of each user is recorded every 5 seconds, which
can be exactly applied in this study. We put the AntTest in
the app store to provide a way for users to download. So
far, the app has been available for more than 600 days since
March 2014. The total number of records is over 103 million
produced by 13,969 users. The detailed data description is
presented in Table 2.The format of one record is presented as
⟨𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐼𝐷, 𝐼𝑀𝐸𝐼, 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐷, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒⟩, where RecordID is the ID
of the record, IMEI indicates the user equipment ID, AppID
is identified by the name and package of the app, and Time
indicates the time of the record. We anonymize the dataset to
conduct the experiment for the privacy concern.
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Figure 2: The permission distribution from apps perspective.
4.2. Evaluation of App Usage. In order to evaluate the privacy
risk when people launch mobile apps, we measure the app
privacy risk, app usage pattern, and DC of users when they
launch apps from their mobile devices.
For the given 900mobile apps in the permission dataset,
we measure the privacy risk of each app, which is one factor
of DC, combining the requested permissions and function
relativity. The average privacy risks (by (4)) of different
mobile app categories are presented in Figure 4. It shows
that all the categories are with privacy risk more than 15.
According to the statistics shown in Figure 1, one mobile app
can access asmany as 25 permissions in the dataset, indicating
the upper bound of the privacy risk factor 𝑅(𝑎
𝑖
) is about 60.
According to our observation, apps are risky if their privacy
risks are over 20 (1/3 of the upper bound). From the figure, the
privacy risk expectation of apps for video, audio, web browser,
shopping, voice, tools, and security is high. In contrast, apps
for news, live streaming, photography, reading, and radio are
relatively secure.
To show the impact of function relativity, we conduct
the evaluation with varied 𝜔
𝑖𝑗
, which is weight for function-
related and function-unrelated permissions. We fix 𝜔
𝑖𝑗
to be
equal to 1 for function-unrelated permissions and vary𝜔
𝑖𝑗
for
function-related permissions with 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 (as the leg-
end) in terms of five-category apps (WiFi, streaming, social,
video, and mail). The result as shown in Figure 5 presents
the average privacy risk of the five categories of mobile apps.
It shows that the trend of privacy risk does not change
with different values. Moreover, the higher the value of 𝜔
𝑖𝑗
chosen for function-related permissions selected, the higher
the privacy risk the mobile apps own. Among all the rest of
experimental results, we use 𝜔
𝑖𝑗
= 0.5 for function-related
permissions and use 𝜔
𝑖𝑗
= 1 for the function-unrelated
permissions to reflect the different privacy violation concern
with respect to function relativity of mobile apps.
The app usage pattern, which is the other factor of DC,
measures the time usage of different apps. Figure 6 shows the
usage time distribution of all apps with respect tomobile apps
usage (Figure 6(a)) and users usage time (Figure 6(b)). They
record 900mobile apps and around 2,000 userswho run these
900 apps in the datasets. Both of them follow the heavy tail
distribution (see the straight line).Majority of apps have short
usage time, while few apps have a long usage time. Similarly,
most users use their mobile devices for short time, while
few users have long time duration for mobile device usage.
To show the usage pattern of specific mobile apps, we select
several typical apps (i.e., WeChat, QQ, and Tencent video)
and show their usage patterns in Figure 7. The plot shows
that over 90% of users run WeChat for less than 104 s, while
this number of users decreases to 75% for Tencent video.This
is due to the different attributes of the apps functionalities,
where WeChat is used for messaging, whereas Tencent video
is used for video playing. The usage time duration for video
playing apps (i.e., Tencent video) should be longer than that
for messaging apps (i.e., WeChat and QQ).
We measure the DC of mobile devices according to user-
app usage pattern and the risk of mobile apps. Specifically,
we evaluate the DC of 50 sampled users given the collected
information of 900 mobile apps and draw the DC value of
each person. In our experiment, the DC value is bounded by
[0, 60). For the convenience of illustration, we ordered theDC
values as shown by the line with forward triangles in Figure 8.
It shows that all users are with DC value larger than 20, and
the highest one reaches almost 30. From our observation, if
DC value is over 20, it indicates that the mobile phone usage
becomes risky. Our selected 50 users are all in the risky status.
4.3. Evaluation of App Usage Recommendation. To evaluate
the performance of the proposed recommendation approach,
we calculate DC values of people under different conditions
to quantify how much danger of mobile apps with respect
to privacy violation to mobile users. Specifically, we vary
the parameter 𝑏 from 0 to 1 and finally to 100, to see the
DC turbulence for different users. We compare the proposed
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Table 3: The requested permissions of news apps.
Permissions Baidu Phoenix Sohu Tencent NetEase CCTV Sina Online retail The paper
Location × × × ×
SMS sending ×
Contacts × ×
Network connection × × × × × × × × ×
Recording × × × ×
Camera × × ×
System setting × × × × × × ×
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Figure 3:Thepermission distribution of different categories of apps.
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Figure 4: The risk distribution of different categories of apps.
approach with the PNB method [10], which only considers
the app risk for recommendation. Indeed, PNB provides the
baseline for the evaluation.
The result of the evaluation is shown in Figure 8. Besides
the ground truth observed in the real world, it presents the
DC value of the proposed recommendation approach in case
of 𝑏 = 0, 𝑏 = 1, and 𝑏 = 100 and PNB method. When
Social Video MailStreamingWiFi
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𝜔 = 0.5
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Figure 5: The impact of function relativity as function of 𝜔
𝑖𝑗
.
𝑏 = 0, the recommendation is led by the personalized user-
app preference, as illustrated by the line with plus marks. It
shows that the danger coefficient is much higher than ground
truth if the privacy risk issue is neglected. Meanwhile, it also
shows that some users’ preference can reach a lower danger
coefficient. This is due to the intrinsic low risk of the mobile
apps.
Furthermore, we consider the situation in which both
user-app preference and privacy have the same importance,
which is considered setting 𝑏 = 1, and the line with backward
triangles is obtained. The DC value is much lower than the
ground truth. Only two users are still with DC value higher
than 20. We further increase the value of 𝑏 to 100 to show the
DC values when the risk takes the dominant role. The result
is shown as the line with solid circles. It reaches almost the
baseline obtained from PNB marked by the line with circles.
Without loss of generality, we consider that the majority of
people would like to consider preference and privacy equally
important. In such case (𝑏 = 1), the DC values reduce to
about 50% on average compared with ground truth.
We further investigate the recommendation results for
news app categories. We first show several common permis-
sions of the news apps in Table 3. In all 7 listed permissions,
only network connection is the function-related permission
Mobile Information Systems 9
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
1
Apps usage time (s)
10
−5
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
PD
F
(a) App usage time
10
−5
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
PD
F
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
1
User usage time (s)
(b) User usage time
Figure 6: The PDF of usage time in terms of apps and users.
QQ
WeChat
Tencent video
×10
4
1 2 3 4 5 60
Usage time (s)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CD
F
Figure 7: The usage pattern of three mobile apps.
to news reading. The remaining 6 permissions such as loca-
tion, SMS, contacts, recording, camera, and system settings
are function-unrelated to these apps. For each app, we mark
a cross if it asks for a certain permission in the corresponding
place. It shows that the app online retail requests only
one function-related permission. CCTV and Sina request
one function-unrelated permission system setting besides
network connection. Baidu, Sohu, NetEase, Phoenix, and
the paper request evenmore function-unrelated permissions.
The most severe one is Tencent, which requests nearly all the
listed permissions.We show the recommendation list of news
apps as a function of different parameters shown in Table 4.
When 𝑏 = 0, Baidu News is the first app recommended,
indicating it fits user preference for news reading. The paper
news is the last one as it is not as popular as the others. When
𝑏 = 1, Baidu News is still in the first place. If people consider
Ground truth
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Figure 8: The DC of random selected 50 users.
privacy and preference equally important, Baidu News is the
best choice. However, Tencent News goes to the last position.
This is mainly due to its violation of user privacy. If the
privacy is considered as the most important factor (when
𝑏 = 100 and PNB), the online retail news app becomes the
first recommended app, due to its lowest privacy violation to
users, as we have shown in Table 3. In contrast, Baidu News
falls into the fourth position. Tencent News still holds the last
position, given its high violation to user privacy.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a method to evaluate the privacy
risk from mobile apps when people use a mobile device.
We evaluated the mobile app privacy risk and defined a
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Table 4: Recommendation list of news apps.
𝑏 = 0 Baidu Phoenix Sohu Tencent NetEase CCTV Sina Online retail The paper
𝑏 = 1 Baidu CCTV Online retail Sina Phoenix Sohu NetEase The paper Tencent
𝑏 = 100 Online retail CCTV Sina Baidu NetEase Sohu Phoenix The paper Tencent
PNB Online retail CCTV Sina Baidu NetEase Sohu Phoenix The paper Tencent
danger coefficient for each user by combining themobile apps
risk and user preference. According to the requirement of
privacy and satisfaction of app usage preference, we proposed
a mobile app recommendation method named AppURank.
The evaluation results showed that the privacy risks of apps
are different, and the DC of mobile users is very high for
many of them. The proposed recommendation method can
help to reduce the danger coefficient by 50% on average and
meanwhile maintains personalized user preference. For the
future work, we will build the mobile app recommendation
system on the mobile device and evaluate the performance
of the recommendation algorithm by implementation and
deployment.
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